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SUMMARY
KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATIONS AND SYMBOLS IN THE MIND.
The central issue in this dissertation is the development and the applica-
tion of an instrument with which to compare several theories of mental repre-
sentation which Íue at present current in cognitive psychology. The mai'
reason for developrng such an instrument lies in the confusion and the lack of
consistency which exists at the present time in relation to central notions in
cognitive psychology. The instrument developed consists of Íive criteria which
are levels of description (c1), morphological criterion (c2), n-place predicate
(c3), direction of reference (c4) and characteristics of slmbols (c5).
In the first part of this study the problem will be formulated (chapter 1)
and the instrument developed (chapter 2). In the second part six cognitive
theories will be described and subsequently evaluated in the light of the crite-
ria. The six selected include Marr's theory of perception (chapter 3), Kosslyn's
theory of mental imagery (chapter 4), Tulving:s theory of episodic memory
(chapter 5), Anderson's ACT*-theory (chapter 6), Kintsch's theory of proposi-
tional representation (chapter 7) and finally Schank & Abelson's theory of
scripts and themes (chapter 8). In the third ptrt, an overview of the results of
the application of the criteria will be given (chapter 9) and finally, several
conclusions (chapter L0) will be derived concerning necessary conditions for a
computational theory of mind.
Part 1.: The problem and the instrument.
In chapter L the background, the assumptions and the central notions of
cognitive psychology are described. Cognitive psychology focusses on the study
of memory, language, perception, problem solving and thinking. The conceptual
impact of cognitive psychology is deeply connected with the development of
the (digital) computer. The underlying connection is the idea that the human
mind and the computer are both instances of information processing systems
which share characteristics such as the manipulation of slmbols, the conditio-
nal structure of information and the exchangeable representational format of
data and processes.
The central concepts in cognrtive psycholog5r are the concepts of slmbol
manipulation, of mental representation and of computation. "Synbol manipula-
tion" implies that the entities on which the processing takes place can be
viewed as symbols. Symbols, in their turn, can be conceived as the consti'
tuent parts of "representations". "Computation" is manifested in the idea that
thinking consists of the processing, storage and retrieval of information.
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The problem with these concepts is twofold. In the first place, these
concepts are very complex and have ambiguous meanirgs and in the second
place, which is partly a consequence of the first, there is still no unified
theory of cognition. Many models and theories have been formulated in cogni-
tive psychology, but these do not fit together effortlessly and indeed often
contradict one another.
A comparison between theories can be carried out in trvo ways. The first
way is by engaging in empirical research. This is what I call an internal
comparison. The second alternative is to compare central concepts in theories
by means of criteria. This is called an external comparison and is the method
selected for this thesis.
The principal problem that will [s highlighted in this dissertation is as
follows: grven the concepts of symbol system, representation and computation,
how is it possible to compare various cognitive theories and what are the
results of these comparisons?
Newell & Simon have been the most outspoken on the symbolical and
representational nature of human and artificial intelligence. According to these
authors, humans and computers are examples or realizations of physical slmbol
systems. Synbol systems are characterized by the fact that they behave flex-
ibly and "symbolically" and that they can be seen as 6nshinss with effectively
computable procedures. The prefix "physical" does not i-ply a reduction to
physics, but applies to a physical realization and the boundaries within which
such a "machine" operates. The conceptual frarnslarelk of symbol systems is the
basis for the cognitive theory of Newell & Simon, within which all intelligent
action, such as decision making, lsas6ning, ild thinking are considered Írs
forms of problem solving.
In the view of Fodor (1981), the research strategy in cognitive psycho-
logy can be called "mental representationalism". ftsasoning and problem solving
in the human system consists of the processing of (mental) representations.
The problem with this statement is that "representation" can be used ambi-
guously &S, for example, in propositional representation, pictorial represen-
tation, procedural representation, declarative representation, representational
content and processes of representation. Maoy controversies in cognitive
theory suppose some notion and interpretation of "representation". By compar-
ing the views of Anderson and Fodor in relation to the unity of the mind it is
made clear that the notion of representation is used a) in the sense of a set
of cognitive entities, b) in the sense of computation or procedure and c) in
the sense of a model of the (physical) world. This last sense focusses on the
aspect of depiction or the mirroring of a (mental) representation.
Concerning the notion of computation, it is not the notion itself but its
nssumption of functionnlism which is most interesting in this respect. The idea














































































the physical structure of a system. Accolding to Block (1981) this starting-
point is called "computation-representation" functionalism. This variant of
functionalism describes the functioning of the human mind in terms of a
computer program. Psychological states are internal states, that is to say
mental representations on which computations are executed. The emphasis in
functionalism is on the definition, the functioning and the coherence of the
components and the sub-components of the system.
The criteria that have been used to characterize and to evaluate the six
cognitive theories have been derived from the notion of computation (criterion
1"), representation (criteria 2, 3, 4) and symbol system (criterion 5). Further-
more, every criterion consists of several labels, what I have called "valences".
By this I mean that, with respect to a criterion, every cognitive theory gets a
value, which indicates the status of that theory.
In chapter 2 the instrument in the form of five criteria is discussed.
Criterion 1 (c1) is about different levels of description and distinguishes a
physical, a functional and an intentional level in order to predict and to
e4plain the behaviour of complex systems (Dennett, 1978). In the physical
stance one tries to use the laws of nature. In the functional stance the only
important aspect is the proper functioning of a system. Neither the physical
realization of the processes and mechanisms nor physical structure is relevant.
What counts in a functional description is the definition of the components
and the relation befween the components of the system. The intentional stance
is necessary rÏ the system is very comple4 so that we can no longer use the
physical and functional descriptions. Instead, intentions, wishes and expecta-
tions are ascribed to the system. But we must remember that in so doing we
are trying to e4plain rationality in terms of rationalify.
With regard to the physical, functional and intentional stance the ideal
level of description for cognitive psychology is the functional stance. It is
therefore very important to separate the levels of description. Valence 1
implies that a cognitive theory or model is functional rn its description. Va-
lence 2 indicates that the separatíon between the physical and functional level
of description is neglected, whereas valence 3 implies that the separation
between the functional and intentional level is neglected. Yalence 4 indicates
that in the theory all necessary distinctions of levels are disregarded.
The second criterion (c2) - the morphologcal criterion - relates to the
various interpretations of the notion of representation that can be distinguish-
ed. This can be illustrated by referring to the following list of overlapping
"synonyns": on the one hand, description, model, symbol set, picture and sign-
system; on the other hand, analogy, depiction, reference, coÍrespondence and
denotation. In the former group the accent is on the domain or the domains in




With regard to the nature of the domains, Palmer Qn8), has formulated
five requirements for a representation. In the first place it should be clear
what the represented domain is and secondly what the basic elements or
entities in this domain are. In the third place it should be clear what the
representing domain is and fourthly what the basic elements in this domain
are. In the fifth place one should establish the coÍrespondences, that is to
say the relation, between the domains.
Two interpretations can be discerned concslning the representation rela-
tion Írs a coÍrnection between domaitts. The first refers to a relation between
representing domains, which I will describe as being the equivalence of do-
mairs, and the second refers to a relation between a ropresenting and a repre-
sented domain. This is called the correspondence or the similalily of donaains.
In cognitive psychology it is often suggested that representation as a
relation presupposes some sort of 5imilarity of domains. A pictorial represen-
tation, for example, is supposed to be similar to what it is actuully u represen-
tation of. This position seems extremely unlikely and the position which will be
adopted in this dissertation is that one of the main problems that theories of
mental representation face, is the so called a priori necessity of a natural
resemblance between a represented and a representing domain.
Valences of the morphologcal criterion Íue 1) that the entities in the
representing domain are defined. Yalence 2) implies that in a cognitive theory
representation is conceived as a symbol seÍ and valence 3) that representation
is conceived as a process or procedure. Valence 4) indicates that representa-
tion is used in the sense of depiction Valence 5) is about the question of
whether resemblance of. domains is or is not a necessary condition for repre-
sentation
The thiÍd criterion (c3) is the criterion of n-place predicates. N-place
predicate means that the representation as a relation takes n predicates.
Working with trvo domains gives the impression that representation is always a
two-place predicate. Nevertheless representation can also be used as a one-
place or a three-place predicate.
Representation as a one-place predicate is equivalent to representation
in the sense of symbol set. In such a case there is no indication of reference
or mirroring. What representation does, is that it classiÍies or categorizes.
The accepted view in cognitive psychology is that a representation is a
two-place predicate, that is to say y is a representation of x (2a), for example
a mental image of a tree. The position is more complicated with two-place
predicates, since it is possible to say that y is a representation for z (2b), for
s;amplo, this is an image for or io -y consciousness. In these two cases x is
standing for the external world, y is the mental system, and z is "conscious-
nesstt or "person".
If














































































If representation is a three-place predicate, then y is a representation of
x for z (3).The problem with this point of view is that it is almost impossible
to determine y (mental system) independently of z (consciousness). The four
valences of this criterion correspond to the numbers grven between brackets.
The fourth criterion (c4) concerns a different aspect of the notion of
representation in that it relates to the direction of reference. For sxample,
domai" A can refer to domain B and vice versa. Here it is possible to discern
literal reference and figurative reference. The expression "John kicks the ball"
has a literal reference, whereas "John is a fox" has a metaphorically one. In
the same way, a picture of my house refers literally to my house, whereas
Picasso's "Guernica" refers metaphorically to the cruelty of war. Complex
reference is a combination of literal and non-literal reference.
Denotation differs from non-denotation in the direction of reference. In
denotation the direction is from symbol set to object or state of affairs,
whereas in non-denotation an object literally or metaphorically refers to
something which could be an object or a synbol (set), but which in any case
literally or metaphorically possesses the property by which it refers to. If an
object literally refers and possesses the property it is referring to in directing
the attention in some respect, it is called exemplification. For evample, a
tailor's swatch directs the attention to the colour or the texture and not to
the size of what it is referring to. This aspect of attention makes exempli-
fication different from instantiation. When the referring is metaphorically, it is
called expression, for sxample in a musical overture which is "tragic".
Valences of this criterion of direction of reference are: 1) denotation, 2)
e;emplification or 3) expression.
The fifth criterion (c5) relates to the characteristics of slmbols. Symbol
sets can be distinguished by examining their syntactical and semantical aspects.
If a symbol set is called a notation, then it is defined by two syntactical and
three semantical requirements. The primary function of a notation, as the most
rigrdly formulated spbol set, is "authoritative identfication". The syntactical
requirements are 1) disjointness, which means that symbols might be replica's
of one another, and 2) finite differentiation, which means that it should be
possible to decide whether a sign belong to the one or to the other symbol.
The semantical requirements are 1") unambigoity of the symbols, 2) disjointness,
which means that the slmbols should not be redundant, and 3) finite differen-
tiation which means that a symbol should apply to at least one reference-class.
Valence 1) of this criterion indicates that none of the requirements is
satisfied; we just have a symbol set, valence 2) that only the syntactical
requirements are satisfied and in this case we speak of. a notational scheme.
Valence 3) indicates that both the syntactical and semantical requirements are
fulfitled in which case we speak of. a notatíon or a notational system.
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Part 2z The material: six theories of mental representation.
In this part, six theories of mental representation - a fair 5ample of the
theories that can be found in cognitive science - are described and evaluated.
In chapter 3, Marr's theory of perception is discussed. According to Marr,
three perceptual levels should be discerned in the human system. Each of these
levels consists of basic input and output elements and of algorithms which
describe the transformation of information from input to output. The first level
is called the primary sketch which gives the changes of intensity and the
geometrical organization of the surfaces. The output-representation of this
level is the input-representation for the next stage, which gives the 2,5-D
sketch. This sketch contains the combination of several modular components of
the perceptual system. The 2,5-D sketch is perceiver-oriented. The next stage
is the 3-D sketch which is entirely object-oriented. The 3-D sketch gives the
information we normally have when we see horses, mountains and cars and it
works with volumetric entities as primilivss and is closely connected with the
higher cognitive processes.
This description is followed by an evaluation based on the five criteria. In
Marr's theory the separation in a functional and a physiological level of
description is neglected (c1). Furthermore, concerning the morphological crite-
rion (cZ), Marr's theory uses representation in the sense of symbol set and
depiction, whereas the entities in the represented domain are clearly defined.
In the criterion of n-place predicates (c3), Marr takes the position that y is a
representation of 4 that is to say representation is a 2a-place predicate. In
his theory the direction of reference (c4) is from symbol sets to states of
affairs which means that it is mainly denotation. With respect to the last
criterion (c5), the symbols in Marr's theory constitute a notational scheme and
not a notational system.
In chapter 4, Kosslyn's theory of mental images is portrayed. Kosslyn
uses the metaphor of the cathode ray tube in order to describe and to explain
the nature and processes of mental imagery. The surface level gives the vivid
impression of "seeing" 5s6sthing with a mind's eye and which consists of
quasi-pictures in a visual buffer. These quasi-pictrues are constructed from two
lower levels of representations, a level of so called literal representation which
has a skeletal structure and a deeper level in long term memory in which the
representations are proposition-like. Besides all these representations, there are
many processes within as well as between the levels of representation.
Kosslyn's theory is mainly formulated in functional terms (c1), but physi-
ological and intentional levels of description aÍe frequently ussd implicitly.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the entities in the represented domains
are clearly formulated (c2). This makes it unclear whether he uses representa-


















































































in the sense of procedure and in the sense of depiction. There is no indication
of resemblance between an inner and an outer domain from which it follows
that representation is used as a Zb-place predicate ("3). Furthermore, his
mentioning of different levels of representation makes it clear that each level
is an expression of another level (c4). Although Kosslyn tries to defend the
position that representation is without symbol sets, it is clear that his model
only functions if one assumes that there are structures which constitute repre-
sentations. The unwillingness to define symbol structures in a more precise
way, makes it clear that the symbol sets in mental imagery are neither nota-
tional schemes nor notational systems (c5).
In chapter 5, Tulving's theory of episodic memory is discussed. According
to Tulving, the research on hrrm31 memory is dominated by semantical and
propositional structures. This, he argues, is suspect, since it does not account
for the fact that people remember episodes and particular situations. For this
reason he proposes an episodic memory system in contrast to a semantic
memory system. The model that Tulving has formulated for the episodic system
is called the General Abstract Processing System (GAPS). This model consists
of nvo sections, storage and retrieval. In the first part of the model, after
encoding, the information is stored in what Tulving calls an originat engram,
whereas in the second part, the information is retrieved as a function of the
matching of the retrieval cue and the encoded and recoded information in
episodic memory. The storage and retrieval Íre independent of semantical
structures.
In Tulving's theory of episodic memory descriptions of the functional,
physiological and intentional level are all intermingled (c1). Furthermore, it is
not clear whether he defines entities in the represented domain, which means
that he refuses to speak of representations in the sense of symbol sets, al-
though representations in Tulving's theory are used in the sense of procedure
and depiction ("2). With regard to representation as an n-place predicate
Tulving's theory has a two-sided orientation. Since there is 3 similarity be-
tween episodes outside and inside the human system, Tulving aÍgues that
representation is a 3-place predicate, that is to say some internal entity is a
representation of an episode for a person's consciousness. A fruther point is
that representation is also a Zb-place predicate (c3). The direction of reference
accordirg to Tulving is mainly from internal system to episodes in the real
world, which means that there is denotation (ca). Tulving refuses to accept
general symbol structures, so his theory is neither a notational scheme noÍ a
notational system. Doubts are raised as to whether GAPS has general symbol
structures io *y case (c5).
Chapter 6 is about Anderson's theory of cognition which is called the
theory of the Adaptive Control of Thought (ACT*). ACT* is semantically or
propositionally orientated and is based alainly on the theory of production
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systems. A production rule consists of a condition-action pair in which, when a
condition is satisfied, ÍLu action is carried out. {ssslding to Anderson, a
cognitive system consists of a declarative memory, a production memory and a
working memory. The way in which the system operates is by the spreading of
activation througb all sorts of nodes and paths. Furthermore, Anderson distin-
guishes three kinds of mental representations: propositional representations,
pictorial representations and temporal string representations.
Anderson's ACT*-theory is mainly formulated in functional terms. Never-
theless he makes references towards physiological levels of description and in
ACT* there are also indications of intentional terms (c1). Concerning the mor-
phological criterion, Anderson tries to define entities for all forms of mental
representation and, over and above, he uses the concept of representation in
the sense of procedure and depiction (c2). The aspect of different forms of
mental representation also has implications for representation as n-place predi-
cate. In Anderson's theory, representation is on the one hand a 2a-place
predicate and on the other a Zb-place predicate (c3). This many-sided inter-
pretation of representation mean^s that the direction of reference is a denota-
tion and an exemplification (or expression) (ca). Anderson certainly tries to
define symbol sets in ACT* and, in respect to propositional representations,
tries to define a notational scheme. In a way a production can be seen as
such. In ACT* no notational system is defined for any of the forms of mental
representation.
In chapter 7, Kintsch's theory of propositional representations is dis-
cussed. Kintsch has formulated a theory of memory in order to explain how
people understand text fragments. His theory has two central issues. In the
flrst place Kintsch presupposes that knowledge and meaning in memory is
represented in the form of propositions. The structure of the representations is
a combination of a case grammar and predicate-Íugument pattern. In the
second place, Kintsch assumes that the information in a text is partly explicit
and partly implicit or deducible. The latter information is stored in the seman-
tical memory system in the sanre propositional format as the explicit informa-
tion. Besides a semantic memory, Kintsch also mentions an episodic system and
both are closely connected.
Kintsch's theory is formulated mainly in functional terms, but implicitly
there are some indications of physiological concepts and sometimes he also
uses intentional terms (c1-). Using the morphologcal criterion, it is clear that
Kintsch tries to define the entities of representation which means that he uses
representation in the sense of slmbol set. He does not use representation in
the sense of procedure and depiction. Similarity of domains is not a require-
ment in his theory (c2). Furthermore, in his theory, representation is mainly a
2b-place predicate (c3) and this means that the direction of reference is such









































(c4). Concerning the aspects of symbols, the entities in memory which Kintsch
uses are such that they constitute a notational scheme, but not a notational
system (c5).
Chapter 8 discusses Schank & Abelson's theory of scripts. This theory
of scripts has been shown to be funda-ental for much research in the field
of artificial intelligence. The most well known example used by Schank 8L
Abelson portrays the story of a visit to a Mcdonald's restaurant. Suppose
someone goes to Mcdonald's, orders some food, pays the bill, gives a big tip
and leaves the restaurant. What could one infer from this event? The point is
that, according to Schank & Abelson, people have scenario's in their head by
which they understand, plan and act. People normally have more or less com-
plex chains of causes in their head which could be called scripts, plans, goals
and themes. The model Schank & Abelson propose consists of two levels. The
lower level is called the level of conceptual dependency, whereas the level
above is called the level of the knowledge structure.
Schank & Abelson do not use physiological terms. The level of descrip-
tion they use is mainly a functional one, but for several aspects of their
theory intentional terms are also applied which means that rationality of the
system is presupposed instead of explained (c1). Furthermore, they use the
notion of representation in the sense of symbol set, procedure and depiction
and by using conceptual dependency and knowledge structures try to define the
elements in the representing domain (c2). Since they use representation in the
sense of depiction and symbol set, representation is applied on the one hand as
a 2a-place predicate, whereas on the other han4 representation is applied as a
2b-place predication ("3). With respect to the criterion of the direction of
reference (c4), this relation in Schank & Abelson's theory on the one hand
forms a denotation, on the other hand an exemplification (or e4pression). The
entities Schank & Abelson define in the conceptual dependency and the know-
ledge structure are such that they form a notational scheme, but not a nota-
tional system (c5).
Part 3: Conclusion and epilogue.
Chapter 9 contains three surveys of the criteria. The first summarizes
the valences of the levels of description, the second the valences of the mor-
phological criterion, the criterion of the n-place predicates and the criterion
of the direction of reference and the thhd the valences concerning the re-
quirements of symbol sets.
Chapter L0 discusses the results of the application of the criteria and is
divided into three parts. The first part is about the confusion conceping the











































and the mental structure and the final part considers the necessary conditions
for a computational theory of mind.
The confusion around the notion of representation used in cognitive psy-
chology can be resolved by clearly distinguishing representation in the sense of
symbol set, of procedure and of depiction. This separation also makes it clear
in which respects propositional representations differ from, for example, analog
representations or semantical representations. The instrument of the five
criteria makes it easier to articulate the differences between the various forms
of representation.
The conclusion suggests that when the syntactical and semantical require-
ments of symbols are considered, none of the cognitive theories that have been
discussed succeed in formulating a notational system or notation. Nevertheless,
it is argued that because of the fact that authoritative identification of struc-
tures is at the centre of theories of synbol manipulation, at least a notational
scheme is necessary for any theory of mental representation. Since a proposi-
tion is discrete and well formed which together are constituents of a notatio-
nal scheme, it is therefore easy to understand why propositional representa-
tions have such a prominent place in recent coenitive psychology.
The third and last part of the conclusion discusses the necessary condi-
tions for a computational theory of mind. The conditions follow from the
valences of the criteria, that is to say that, because of the specification of
the valences, it is possible to isolate the "ideal" valences for a computational
theory of mind.
In the first place such a theory should be formulated on a functional
level of description and it should be made clear how the loans that are taken
out of rationality could be settled.
In the second place, the entities in the representing domain should be
defined, that is to say, they should at least form a notational scheme.
In the thkd place, representation as a three-place predicate should be
avoided, since it involves a circular argument. Furthermore, the whole idea of
a (natural) similuity benveen a represented and a representing domain should
be abandoned. Resemblance of ds6ains is a consequence of the choice for a
representation zrnd not the reason for it. Cognitive psychology should stop
worrying about the represented domair, that is to say about the external
world.
In the fourth place, a differentiation between representation in the sense
of syrnbol set, procedure and depiction is recommended.
The conclusion which is drawn from the above mentioned aspects is that
cognitive psychology does not yet contain a computational theory of mind
without r6611gsmings. Nevertheless, the foundations of cognitive science are
already present, the walls are being erected and positive steps are being taken
towards ss13lli5hing the final edifice (Newell, 1987).
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